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The Missing Link:
Post-Conflict Doctrine For the Common Man

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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14 February 2005

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the reasons why the U.S. military has difficulties in post-conflict operations. In light of swift and stunning military victories, it seems inconsistent that the goals of self-sustaining peace and rule of law cannot be more efficiently established. While U.S. combat skills have become more proficient and dominant, America continues to struggle to reap the benefit of its military victories.

This paper argues that joint doctrine emphasizes the planning and execution of major combat operations at the expense of post-conflict actions. Doctrine orients around the fundamental purpose of winning the war not the peace. This focus has impeded the development of necessary doctrine to guide the transition from combat to peace.

The conclusions and recommendations find that the range of military operations impedes adequate planning for post-conflict operations. In its place, a continuum of conflict is proposed that removes a dividing line between war and Military Operations Other Than War and integrates a visual representation of the requirement of civilian coordination and interaction. Specific doctrine needs to be developed that focuses on addressing some common problems of post-conflict operations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ii
INTRODUCTION	1
ANALYSIS.....	2
CONCLUSIONS.....	15
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	16
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	19

INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the reasons why the U.S. military has difficulties in post-conflict operations. In light of the swift and stunning military victories, it seems inconsistent that the goals of self-sustaining peace and rule of law cannot be more efficiently established. While U.S. combat skills have become more proficient and dominant, America continues to struggle to reap the benefit of its military victories.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is no exception. Major combat operations were concluded in short order and Saddam Hussein was decisively swept from power. Yet, this victory is hollow as Iraq remains mired in daily violence. It is too early to label the operation a failure, but Iraq joins a list of post-conflict struggles. The vexing question is why such dominant combat power is insufficient to achieve the desired end state.

B.H. Liddell Hart stated that “The object of war is a better state of peace-even if only from your own point of view.”¹ This statement reflects the intimate relationship war must have with peace. War does not exist in a vacuum and has no objective except to arrive at a state of peace. All actions in war must seek to attain the final end state.

This paper argues that joint doctrine emphasizes the planning and execution of major combat operations at the expense of post-conflict actions. Doctrine orients around the fundamental purpose of winning the war not the peace. This focus has impeded the development of necessary doctrine to guide the transition from combat to peace.

The argument will be divided into two sections. First, the range of military operations will be analyzed in regard to its impact on prioritization of planning and execution of military actions. Second, current doctrine will be analyzed to determine its ability to

¹ Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d Revised Ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1967; reprint, New York: Meridian, 1991), 338 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

effectively conduct post-conflict operations.

ANALYSIS

WAR AND MOOTW:

This section will analyze the range of military operations and its impact of post-conflict actions. It will be shown that the separation of operations into war and Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) adversely influences military planning and execution.

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS:

The range of military operations (Figure 1) divides military actions into either War or MOOTW. These distinctions are intended to simplify understanding and facilitate planning

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			
MILITARY OPERATIONS		GENERAL US GOALS	REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack / Defend / Blockade
	NONCOMBAT <i>Military Operations Other Than War</i>	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement Counterterrorism Show of Force/Raid/Strike Peacekeeping/Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Nation Assistance
		Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities	Freedom of Navigation Counterdrug Humanitarian Assistance Protection of Shipping US Civil Support

Figure 1 Range of Military Operations
(Joint Publication 3-0, I-2)

and execution.² War is defined as “large-scale, sustained combat operations” with the purpose of achieving a favorable outcome.³ MOOTW encompasses a wide range of military activities principally intended to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support civil authorities. MOOTW is sub-divided by two mission types that are differentiated by whether force is used.

Doctrine sets priorities between these categories. War is designated the fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces. Success in combat is stated to be “the essential goal and measure of value of the profession of arms.”⁴ MOOTW is described as an “inherent secondary purpose.”⁵

Separate principles have been developed to guide the planning and execution of military action at all levels. The principles of war are: objective, offense, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. The principles of MOOTW are: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION:

The division of military operations impacts planning in three interrelated ways. First, the division shapes the perception of how and when the other elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) come into play. Second, the division implicitly prioritizes operational phasing. Third, the division skews the emphasis of comprehensive planning.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: November 14, 2000), III-14.

³ Ibid., III-14.

⁴ Ibid., III-1.

⁵ Ibid., III-1.

Doctrine emphasizes the need to coordinate action between all the instruments of national power. Joint Publication 1 chapter I details the interaction between all the instruments. However, Joint Publication 3-0 notes that combat operations may be conducted when “other instruments of national power...are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives.”⁶ On the other hand, military power is used in MOOTW “to support the other instruments of national power.”⁷ Figure 1 (Range of Military Operations) does not graphically display any indication of where the instruments of national power should be applied.

Given the discussion in Joint Publication 3-0, it would appear that the other instruments become important and assume the lead after the conclusion of the war. The impact on planning is that the military should focus on the war and the other instruments will plan the peace operations. Frederick Barton, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, related that during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the military concentrated on the war while post-conflict planning was considered a civilian task.⁸ Likewise, during the planning for Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama 1989) it was assumed that the Department of State would be primarily responsible for restoration.⁹

⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), I-3.

⁷ Ibid., I-3. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: 16 June 1995), I-1 where MOOTW is “applied to complement other instruments of national power.”

⁸ James Fallows, “Blind in Baghdad,” The Atlantic Monthly, (Jan/Feb 2004): 69.

⁹ Richard H. Schulz, Jr, In the Aftermath of War (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 17-18.

The separation between war and MOOTW causes the military planners to focus on the phases involving combat vice the whole operation. In order to assist in the visualization and organization, doctrine recommends dividing the operation in four phases (Figure 2):




Figure 2 Phases
(Joint Publication 3-0, III-19)

Deter/Engage (deploy forces/show of force), Seize the initiative (conduct operations forcing reactive actions by adversary), Decisive Operations (Dominant maneuver and offense overwhelming and defeating adversary), and Transition (post-conflict operations transitioning to civilian control).¹⁰ Regressive planning is used to develop actions and objectives for each phase. This process involves determining the military conditions necessary to achieve a desired end state then determining the actions that will likely produce the military end state. Subordinate objectives are determined for each action, which become phases of the operation. The phase objectives are the linkage between the current situation

¹⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, Joint Publication 5-00.1 (Washington, DC: 25 January 2002), II-16 and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, III-18.

and the desired end state.

Once determined, though unintentional, the military focuses on the phases that involve preparation and execution of combat. The most likely cause is the doctrinal focus on war as the fundamental mission. Equally important is the fact that war planning tends to be more concrete than the issues faced in the post-conflict phase. Likewise, there is a perception, as discussed earlier, fostered by doctrine that post-conflict is primarily a civilian responsibility. Furthermore, the doctrinal diagram mapping the phases (Figure 2) indicates the focus should be on transitioning control to civilians and redeployment.

The preconceived notion is that Phase III operations are the crux of the military contribution to the desired end state. Joint Publication 3-0 states that the decisive phase focuses on “driving the adversary to culmination and achieving the objectives defined by the NCA [National Command Authority] and JFC [Joint Force Commander].”¹¹ However, while Phase III is a necessary first step it does not attain the desired end state in itself. Phase IV, or the transition phase, is the “decisive” phase that determines mission success or failure. The Defense Science Board recognized that “without success in the aftermath of large-scale hostilities the United States will not achieve its political goals—the reason for going to war in the first place”¹² Likewise, it was noted post-conflict “operations can consume resources as large as those consumed by major combat operations, and for much longer periods of time.”¹³

Current doctrine acknowledges this fact stating that “defeating an enemy military

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, III-21.

¹² Defense Science Board, 2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2004), 6.

¹³ Ibid., 6.

force is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure a long term solution to a crisis.”¹⁴ Indeed, Joint Publication 3-0 states that “military victory is measured in the achievement of the overall political goal and associated termination objectives.”¹⁵ Despite this fact, James Fallows reported that “If you went to the Pentagon before the war, all the concentration was on the war,...If you went there during the war, all the concentration was on the war. And if you went there after the war, they'd say, 'That's Jerry Bremer's job.’”¹⁶ This indicates that despite new doctrine, not much has changed since Panama in 1989 when General Maxwell R. Thurman paid little attention “to the post-conflict planning because he was too concerned with fighting the battle.”¹⁷

While no direct link is definitively provable, one can argue that the division of war and MOOTW impedes the recognition of the continuum of conflict from peace to war and back to peace. This division is counter to Clausewitz’s observation that “war is a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse.”¹⁸ The doctrinal focus on war can logically be seen to cause the military to subjugate the post-conflict requirements to the needs of combat. As will be discussed below, this tendency results in a failure to adequately plan.

JOINT DOCTRINE OF POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS:

This section will discuss the recurring characteristics and requirements in a post-

¹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, I-5.

¹⁵ Ibid., I-11.

¹⁶ Fallows, 69.

¹⁷ William Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” Parameters, (Autumn 2003), 108.

¹⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, (ed. And trans. Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret), On War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.

conflict environment and current doctrine. There are many aspects that are worthy of study but this paper focuses on two critical issues: Interagency Coordination and Essential Missions. Conclusions will be drawn to determine if doctrine needs to be adjusted.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND PLANNING:

Current doctrine recognizes that military action alone will not result in the desired end state. Other instruments of national power are important before and after a conflict. The guidance on this topic, especially in regards to post-conflict, is good but too hard to find. Likewise, the guidance fails to provide adequate instruction of how and who should be involved.

The post-conflict environment is complex. Immediate and varied tasks are required, even while combat persists, to address issues in “humanitarian assistance, public health, infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, civil administration, and media.”¹⁹ The military cannot do this alone, the skills and competencies of civilian organizations need to be utilized and efforts must be coordinated.

Joint doctrine recognizes and comments extensively on the need to coordinate. Joint Publication 1 states that “early inclusion of interagency considerations in military assessments, estimates, and plans will facilitate civil-military integration of effort.”²⁰ Elsewhere, doctrine discusses the high level coordination emanating from the National Security Council and introduces the idea of a political-military plan. Military operations require “a high degree of integrated and synchronized interagency participation” to ensure

¹⁹ Defense Science Board, 43.

²⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, xi.

that the long-term desired end states are achieved following a conflict.²¹ The concept of a civil-military operations center (CMOC) is introduced as a means to effect the desired coordination.

Joint Publication 3-0 expands the coordination concept and recognizes that military action alone is rarely sufficient. “Follow-up political exploitation...requires early planning, liaison, and coordination.”²² It is necessary to build consensus and a common understand of objectives to ensure cooperation. “Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.”²³ Post-conflict operations are stated to involve all the instruments of national power and include multiple U.S. government agencies, non-governmental organizations and private organizations, some of which may precede the military presence.

Joint Publications 3-07 (MOOTW), 3-57 (Civil-Military Operations), 3-08 (Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations) continue to expand the depth of discussion. Interagency coordination is highlighted as critically important. Post-conflict operations are stated to be “primarily CMO [Civil-Military Relations].”²⁴ Significant discussion on coordination structures to include a Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) is presented. Early coordination and planning prior to combat is identified as instrumental to ensure a “comprehensive, holistic assessment” to minimize duplicity of efforts and ensure all aspects will be addressed.

Doctrine does an exceptional job of highlighting the difficulties and requirements for

²¹ Ibid., II-5.

²² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, I-12.

²³ Ibid., I-7.

²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-57 (Washington, DC: 8 February 2001), I-19,

early coordination. Yet, the Department of State identifies that as of 2004, there are still “Key Gaps” in joint-civilian planning and unclear transfer of authority between military and civilian control.²⁵ There is a disconnect between doctrine and execution.

One cause is likely inherent to doctrine. The principle of security is to “never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.”²⁶ Operational security exhorts joint forces to “gain and maintain essential secrecy about...(friendly) capabilities, activities, and intentions.”²⁷ These conditions limit the access of civilian agencies to operational military plans. Thus, coordination and integration are difficult. In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, it has been reported that “sheer secrecy worked against the ability to conduct in-depth, interagency planning.”²⁸ Doctrine needs to develop a process that permits inclusion of organizations into the planning while balancing operational needs.

Secondly, it could be a matter of organization. Doctrine uses very broad language that is dispersed in many locations. However, the heart of operational planning and execution is discussed in Joint Publication 3-0, chapters III-V. While there are several discussions, there is no comprehensive statement that combines all the necessary inputs. Chapter III (Planning Joint Operations) should concisely summarize the importance and structure of interagency coordination. There is no mention of the political-military plan guiding the overall action that could provide insights into what agencies will be doing in the theater. Additionally, this chapter needs to discuss the importance of interagency input into

²⁵ U.S. Department of State, Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2.

²⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, A-2.

²⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, III-39.

²⁸ James D. Scudieri, “Iraq 2003-4 and Mesopotamia 1914-18: A Comparative Analysis in Ends and Means,” (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2004), 19.

the determination of courses of action in the Phase III (Decisive Operations). Doctrine recognizes the critical importance that military operations are not counter to long-term objectives. However, the input from follow-on civilian agencies is not institutionalized into military planning.

It has been noted that “the quality, quantity, and kind of preparation in peacetime determine...success in stabilization and reconstruction. If an operation starts badly, it is difficult to recover.”²⁹ The integration of civilian agencies affects not only the post conflict but should impact combat course of action as well. While doctrine addresses the fundamental importance of this coordination, it must be refined to emphasize it in the critical places referenced most often for planning and execution. Specifically, Joint Publication 3-0 and Joint Publication 5-00.1 should comprehensively address the issues of coordination, security, and course of action development.

ESSENTIAL MISSIONS:

The post-conflict environment is characterized by disorder, displaced persons, and violence with little to no effective government. The establishment of security and stability is the first task that must be completed. However, security can not be completed in isolation. Important security elements require a recovering economy that provides jobs, provision of basic needs, civil administration, and infrastructure repair. Though long-term work in each of these areas is a civilian task, the military must expect and accept responsibility to initiate these programs. As addressed in the previous section, care must be taken to coordinate military action with follow-on civilian intent to ensure consistent unified efforts.

Joint Doctrine recognizes many of these requirements. Joint Publications 3-0 and 3-

²⁹ Defense Science Board, 20.

07 identify that the types of post-conflict activities are “transition to civil authorities, support truce negotiations, civil affairs efforts to reestablish a civil government, psychological operations to foster continued peaceful relations, and logistic support.”³⁰ Additionally, the Joint Force Commander is tasked to ensure the threat does not “resurrect itself” while being responsive to humanitarian needs.³¹ Joint doctrine continues to instruct that the military will likely have to provide “refugee control, reestablish civil order and public services, (and) medical assistance.”³² Various MOOTW actions are required to establish the necessary conditions.

Doctrine addresses most of the major concerns but fails to recognize the intensity, duration, and the need for a comprehensive application of operations. In all likelihood, post-conflict operations will be harder than combat. Joint Publication 3-0 should identify the challenges and needs of the post-conflict environment. Additionally, joint doctrine needs to develop more comprehensive guidance that structures the many diverse actions required during post-conflict operations.

History has shown a direct “correlation between the size of the stabilization force and the level of risk...most adequately manned post-conflict operations suffered no casualties whatsoever.”³³ Likewise, contrary to the military’s desire to “exit” and redeploy, stability requires extended presence. Successful reconstruction operations require military presence

³⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publication 3-07, IV-12.

³¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, III-25.

³² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, V-5.

³³ James Dobbins and others, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), xxv.

for at least 5 years.³⁴ Failures in Somalia support this assertion as reconstruction efforts terminated after U.S. forces departed.³⁵ Robert Rotberg observes that the U.S. should not “be in such a hurry to leave...These things are best done well than done rapidly.”³⁶

Joint Publication 3-0 and 3-07 state that commanders may “need to realign forces or adjust force structure to begin post-conflict operations. Given historical trends this is an understatement. Recent studies have found that the “more swift and bloodless the military victory, the more difficult postconflict [*sic*] stabilization can be.”³⁷ Likewise, observers have noted that post-conflict force requirements exceed combat needs. Some metrics have been developed to estimate force size noting that it varies on the condition of society and ambitiousness of goals.³⁸

While doctrine discusses prevention of the threat resurrecting, it fails to identify and address that, as evidenced in Iraq, the nature of the threat changes. The power vacuum created by a falling regime facilitates the creation of armed groups. This is not a singular phenomenon. Spoilers and looters can be expected. However, the military commander must differentiate between three general groups: total, limited, and greedy spoilers. Not all groups need to be forcibly neutralized. Limited and greedy spoilers are amicable to negotiation, or failing that, subject to legal repercussions.³⁹ The British learned in 1915 Iraq

³⁴ Ibid., xxiv.

³⁵ Jayne A. Carson, “Nation-Building, The American Way,” (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2003), 22.

³⁶ Robert Rotberg, “Failed States,” Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI; 26 January 2005.

³⁷ Dobbins, xxii.

³⁸ Defense Science Board, viii.

³⁹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept (Suffolk, VA: September 2004), 12-14.

that “fining was a more effective retaliation and deterrent...than burning and shelling.”⁴⁰

The total spoilers, however, pose the greatest threat and likely will require combat operations to isolate and neutralize them.

To reduce the spoiler’s manpower pool, doctrine needs to specifically guide the process of demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating of combatants into society. This issue is complex and must be fused within a larger societal reconstruction. Doctrine should explicitly state the need for “a viable strategy (to) dismantle command and control structures; relocate soldiers to communities; limit the circulation and individual possession of weapons and small arms; and provide employment, educational opportunities, and community reintegration programs.”⁴¹

Current doctrine implies MOOTW actions are adequate to achieve security and stability. MOOTW missions provide many necessary skills but do not comprehensively address the totality of issues. For instance, conducting counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance operations are required. No doctrine describes how to integrate both of them. Likewise, MOOTW is generally targeted at “assisting” a host-nation. Indigeneous capabilities need to be built. MOOTW does not adequately address this deficiency. In short, MOOTW describes important tasks but a more comprehensive recognition of the post-conflict mission is required.

In post-conflict operations, the military must establish stability. Adequate stability is comprehensive and elusive but can be measured by the progress of society back towards a steady state of normalcy. It is the foundation of the remaining tasks of reconstruction.

⁴⁰ Scudieri, 11.

⁴¹ Play To Win (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003), 10.

Without adequate progress, it has been observed that:

Refugees and internally displaced persons will wait until they feel safe to go home; former combatants will wait until they feel safe to lay down their arms and reintegrate into civilian life or a legitimate, restructured military organization; farmers and merchants will wait until they feel that fields, roads, and markets are safe before engaging in food production and business activity; and parents will wait until they feel safe to send their children to school, tend to their families, and seek economic opportunities.⁴²

Doctrine correctly states that civil administration will be necessary. However, more details are necessary. Specifically, the process of determining the laws and structure of civil institutions take time and must reflect local customs while remaining congruent with U.S. long term goals.⁴³ Without cultural knowledge and time, civil administration will be haphazard. Failure to address these issues adequately will likely result in “the explosion of lawlessness, corruption, and crime that often accompany post-conflict vacuums [and will] undermine all gains that international assistance makes.”⁴⁴

In summary, doctrine makes correct and broad statements on the conduct of post-conflict operations. These statements require more thought and refinement. Historical lessons can provide much more detail. Specifically, post-conflict doctrine needs to address increased force levels, extended presence, administration of law, discretionary combat, and reestablishment the local economy. These tasks are comprehensive and current MOOTW doctrine is inadequate.

CONCLUSIONS

While the current Range of Military Operations concept aids in differentiating major

⁴² Play To Win, 10.

⁴³ Rotberg Lecture.

⁴⁴ Play to Win, 11-12.

combat activities vice smaller military actions, it impedes the planning of post-conflict requirements. Specifically, the range prevents the holistic view of the continuum of operations and the necessary linkage between war and peace. This division overcomes the doctrinal edicts and regressive planning process and minimizes the importance of post-conflict phase.

Furthermore, doctrine contains broad statements that are very important on the conduct of modern war. However, this information is spread throughout many different publications and can be contradictory. Doctrine should be providing clear and concise guidance that is easy to reference. Pertinent post-conflict planning considerations are both inadequate and not succinctly provided in the two most referenced locations: Joint Publications 3-0 and 5-00.1.

Likewise, joint doctrine does not address many critical aspects of post-conflict stability to include the required time, forces, and resources and the probable complex environment. Joint doctrine tends to minimize the issues and fosters the belief that MOOTW will provide appropriate guidance. Joint doctrine needs to embrace post-conflict complexities and develop more comprehensive instruction.

U.S. military's fundamental purpose and concept of operations serve to divide planning and execution. This seam has resulted in disjointed transitions from war to peace. Modern threats can and have exploited this disconnect.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The military's fundamental purpose should change. Care should be taken to keep the emphasis on combat proficiency. However, stability operations should be recognized as a fundamental task. Recommend rephrasing purpose to read: "The U.S. military's fundamental

purpose is the application of the military instrument of power to attain and preserve dominant presence in combat and stability operations in order to facilitate attainment of national objectives.”




Figure 3 Continuum of Conflict

The range of military operations should shift to a continuum of conflict (Figure 3). The advantage of this model is the lack of a dividing line between the levels of conflict and the mix of the various instruments of power. It represents the different tools necessary depending on the level of conflict but reinforces the need for plans to cover contingencies throughout the spectrum.

The principles of war and MOOTW should merge to become Principles of Military Power so as to eliminate any legacy focus on war. The resulting list will be: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Effort, Security, Surprise, Simplicity, Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy. Nothing will be lost and the planner can now reference one list for the entire operation.

The current disparate MOOTW operations should be merged into one organized plan that identifies the challenges and address the necessary objectives. Specifically, doctrine

should address the need for a separate senior Joint Task Force-Post Conflict (JTF-PC) Commander who is established prior to or at the time of initial crisis action planning and has authoritative input into the planning of combat operations. While current command and control doctrine theoretically supports a single commander for both combat and post-combat operations, experience has shown the proclivity of the military to focus on combat. The establishment of a separate post-conflict commander will mitigate these tendencies. Furthermore, the JTF-PC will be the Regional Combatant Commander's liaison during the entire operation with civilian organizations. To this end, Civil Affairs Doctrine and Civil-Military Relations doctrine should be integrated into Stability Operations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff must develop a process to facilitate pre-operational planning that balances the needs of operational security but permits input from all necessary organizations, to include international private organizations. This paper strongly recommends the observations and guidance of U.S. Joint Forces Command Stability Operations Concept and the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability and Support Operations be used to modify and rewrite current doctrine.

In the past, the difficulties of post-conflict operations have been expensive in both lives and treasure. However, the 2002 National Security Strategy stated that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones" and clearly stated an intent to conduct preemptive action to neutralize a developing threat.⁴⁵ This new strategy makes it imperative for the military to match combat prowess with post-conflict competence.

⁴⁵ George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 1.

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